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The Logic of State Mobilization in Bolivarian Venezuela
Sam Handlin
9.1 introduction
Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Movement came to power in 1999 promising
to refound the Venezuelan state and restructure the polity in ways that would
build “popular power” through the promotion of grassroots participation,
organization, and mobilization. Once in office, the Bolivarian forces launched
a series of initiatives to sponsor organization and mobilization among
supporters, which ranged widely in their functions and strategic purpose. State-
mobilized organizations can be seen as operating in three different arenas of
politics: the local governance arena; the electoral arena; and the protest arena.
From an ideological standpoint, the BolivarianMovement was oriented toward
sponsoring organizations that could operate in the first of these arenas, helping
realize Chávez’s vision of constructing a “protagonistic democracy” by
establishing vehicles for citizen participation in local governance. In the
terminology of this volume, these activities are best seen as a form of
“infrastructural mobilization,” working to solidify political support and
achieve the government’s longer-term aims. As the polarizing Bolivarian
government met with opposition, however, its initiatives in social
mobilization often became geared toward sponsoring organizations suited to
operating in the electoral and protest arenas. These activities are best seen as
forms of “reactive” and “proactive” mobilization, ways to defend against
threats posed by an increasingly powerful opposition.
I propose a mirroring theory for explaining the evolution of state-mobilized
groups in Venezuela and their respective emphases, which reduces to two
claims. First, the degree to which the government has engaged in
infrastructural mobilization, with state-mobilized groups geared toward the
local governance arena, vis-à-vis proactive or reactive mobilization, with
those groups geared toward the protest or electoral arenas, has been inversely
related to the seriousness of the threat posed by the opposition. Second, when
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engaged in the latter forms of mobilization, the government has focused on
sponsoring organizations best suited to operate in whichever of these two
arenas – that of protests or elections – has corresponded to the focus of
opposition strategies during particular time periods. This mirroring theory,
which has some resemblance to the notion of “mirror-image design”
advanced in Chapter 8, helps us think systematically about the motives
behind mobilizational initiatives and how incumbents decide between
multiple strategic option, one of the key issues highlighted in this volume’s
introduction. While governments may draw on an extensive repertoire of
mobilizational strategies to “rule by other means,” the imperative of dealing
with open opposition threats may tends to trump other motivations when
making these choices.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 highlights two contextual
variables – the competitiveness of autocratic regimes and strength of states –
that serve as scope conditions, shaping the strategic environment and giving
state-mobilized movements (SMMs) a distinctive character in Venezuela
when compared to other autocracies examined in this volume. The bulk
of the chapter – Sections 9.3 through 9.7 – then presents the mirroring
theory. To do so, I break the Bolivarian era into four periods distinguished
by variation in the degree and nature of opposition threats and examine
how mobilizational initiatives changed in response to this shifting
landscape.
9.2 contextual conditions shaping strategy choice
Bolivarian Venezuela possessed two important contextual conditions – a highly
competitive autocratic regime and a very weak state – that differentiate the case
from many others examined in this volume and which greatly influenced the
logic and nature of SMMs. This section first offers some background
information on Venezuela before the rise to power of the Bolivarian
Movement. I then explicitly discuss these two contextual conditions and how
they shaped SMMs in Bolivarian Venezuela.
9.2.1 Background
Venezuela possessed one of Latin America’s longest-standing democracies prior
to the Bolivarian era. This democratic regime was established in 1958 after
a broad opposition movement successfully overthrew the dictatorship of
Marcos Pérez Jiménez. As democracy collapsed across South America in the
1960s and 1970s, Venezuela’s “Punto Fijo” democracy (so named after the
location at which its founding pact was agreed upon) proved remarkably
resilient and stable. During the 1970s and early 1980s, scholars frequently
invoked the idea of “Venezuelan exceptionalism,” referring to an island of
democratic rule and relative political stability amid a sea of military regimes
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or, as in neighboring Colombia, seemingly intractable civil conflicts (Ellner and
Tinker Salas, 2005).
Punto Fijo democracy was also beset by several severe pathologies, which
eventually fostered great citizen alienation and discontent. Perhaps most
consequentially, Venezuelan democracy was erected on a very weak state in
which corruption and patrimonialism were widespread. While the oil economy
boomed in the 1970s, such issues were easy to sweep under the rug. When oil
prices crashed and the country experienced other economic challenges in the
1980s, these long-standing problems with corruption increased in salience. The
last decades of the twentieth century therefore saw Venezuela mired in a deep
“state crisis,” a situation in which the state proved highly ineffective in the
delivery of basic goods and highly venal in its treatment of citizens, leading to
widespread discontent with basic state institutions (Handlin, 2017).
The Bolivarian Movement led by Hugo Chávez emerged in this context,
promising to refound the Venezuelan state and create a “protagonistic
democracy” that would open up new avenues for popular participation.
These ideas were already developed in many of the programmatic documents
that Chávez and other conspirators drew up to present to the public before
launching a coup against the Venezuelan government in 1992. While the coup
failed, Chávez and other leaders of the MBR-200 elicited great sympathy from
a highly anti-systemic public fed upwith the country’s political class. Therefore,
Chávez and the MBR-200 were able to garner a pardon and contest the 1998
elections, running on a program centered on the convocation of a constituent
assembly to rewrite the constitution, refound the Venezuelan state, and
implement a more participatory form of government that would address the
deficits of representation and social citizenship in the Punto Fijo system.
9.2.2 A Highly Competitive Autocracy
After winning power, Chávez and the Bolivarian forces utilized the constituent
process not only to write a new constitution but also to remove opponents from
the state and neuter institutions of horizontal accountability (Coppedge, 2002;
Corrales and Penfold, 2011; Handlin, 2017). Domination over the state
subsequently allowed the Bolivarian forces to tilt the playing field against
opponents, such that by 2004 the political regime was best considered
competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Way, 2002).
Competitive authoritarianism in Venezuela involved a relatively contested
and liberal autocracy, even when compared to other hybrid regimes.
Throughout the Bolivarian period, the opposition has been given fairly wide
latitude to mobilize and protest in the streets. Only after the start of a large
protest cycle in 2014 did serious repression begin, and that repression was not
extensive enough to dissuade activity in the protest arena altogether. The
electoral arena in Venezuela has also been unusually competitive (see Table
9.1). From 1999 through 2003, no election was held to which the opposition
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wholeheartedly committed. From 2004 onward, however, highly contested
elections or referendum were held nearly every year, due to renewed
opposition commitment to electoral strategies, the nonconcurrent electoral
calendar, and the plebiscitarian nature of the Bolivarian Revolution, which
sometimes led to major referenda being held in years without regularly
scheduled elections.
The highly competitive nature of the authoritarian regime in Venezuela
strongly shaped the government’s approach to SMMs, incentivizing reliance
on social mobilization as a tool for countering opposition in the protest arena
and for building a set of grassroots organizations that could coordinate with
party structures for campaigning and electioneering. The Bolivarian
government entered office greatly invested in using social mobilization for
other purposes, especially activities in the local governance arena that most
closely mirror the concept of “infrastructural development” advanced in the
introduction of this volume. Faced with high levels of opposition threat in both
the protest and electoral arenas given the regime context, however, the
government was pressed into activities that more neatly fit into the categories
table 9.1 Major elections and referenda during the Fifth
Republic, 1999–2017
Year Election Margin
1999 Constituent Assembly +44 (Semi-boycotted)




2004 Recall referendum +16
2005 Legislative Boycotted
2006 Presidential +26
2007 Constitutional referendum −1
2008 Gubernatorial +12
2009 Constitutional referendum +10
2010 Legislative +1
2011 None







of “reactive” and “pro-active”mobilization. The case points to a more general
proposition about autocracies: the more competitive the regime, the more likely
that governments will focus on reactive and proactive strategies rather than
other forms of social mobilization less directly geared toward dealing with open
opposition.
9.2.3 State Weakness
After rising to prominence and power through critiques of the Venezuelan state
crisis and the political status quo, the BolivarianMovement inherited this weak
state in office (Handlin, 2017). State weakness shaped the nature of SMMs in
Bolivarian Venezuela in several ways. For one, the weak state further fueled
reliance on state-mobilized groups in general. At the head of a state that had
proven highly corrupt and frequently incapable of delivering services and
providing public goods, Chávez’s options for using established state structures
to mobilize support were limited. It is no surprise, for example, that his first
major initiative in social policy – Plan Bolívar 2000 – was implemented mainly
through the military, the one wing of the state apparatus in which he placed
confidence. As we will see, the subsequent reliance on SMMs and the formation
of para-statal entities like the Communal Councils to mobilize support and
achieve local governance objectives reflected a similar logic. While the
Bolivarian Movement had an ideological commitment to such notions,
necessity – in this case, a weak state apparatus – was also the mother of
invention.
The Venezuelan experience also demonstrates that state weakness is likely to
place substantial limitations on the ability of governments to control state-
mobilized groups. Principle-agent problems are inherent to situations in
which states mobilize parts of society to do their bidding and accomplish
particular goals. Those societal groups, once formed and mobilized, may
operate according to their own incentives and goals, which may not fully
align with those actors within the state who supported and pushed their
mobilization. Following analyses of principle-agent dynamics from many
other settings, we might conclude that the ability of states to monitor the
activities of state-mobilized groups and to credibly sanction them for bad
behavior will be critical to limiting principle-agent problems that might arise.
Weak states are likely to have less capacity for both monitoring and
sanctioning. Entities tasked with liaising with state-mobilized groups –
whether relevant bureaucratic agencies or, in some cases, security services –
are likely to have less potent tools for covert surveillance, less capacity for
organizing and maintaining records related to the activities of state-mobilized
groups, and less ability to decisively act to punish state-mobilized groups that
pursue nonsanctioned activities.
As we will see, a recurrent dynamic during the Fifth Republic, observable
even in its earliest years and particularly notable more recently, has involved
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state-mobilized groups affiliated with the Bolivarian Movement engaging in
activities that compromise or complicate the broader goals of the government.
In particular, certain state-mobilized groups (a subset of Bolivarian Circles in
the early years, a subset of colectivos, or community-based support groups,
more recently) have often engaged in violence and crime. The Venezuelan
government has supported at least some of this violence, using state-mobilized
groups as vehicles for sowing fear among the opposition. But the activities of
these groups have also seemed beyond the control of the government at times.
And the government’s association with them has tended to be viewed very
negatively by the Venezuelan public, leading to losses of mass support. To
a less spectacular degree, the principle-agent problem can also be seen as
relevant to the government’s attempt to use certain state-mobilized groups as
vehicles for electoral mobilization. One of the constant challenges the
government has faced has involved creating groups that would work
cooperatively with Bolivarian parties.
9.3 mirroring threats: explaining variation in state
mobilization over time
The chapter now turns to an explanation of change over time within the
Venezuelan case. The focus is not so much to test the propositions established
in the previous section regarding state and regime context but to analyze how
and why – with this context largely taken as a given – the Venezuelan
government’s approach to mobilization shifted so much during the
Bolivarian era.
State-mobilized organizations serve many functions and often operate in
multiple arenas of politics in authoritarian contexts. The logic animating state
decisions to create or cultivate these organizations (and to create or cultivate
particular types of organizations in particular situations) can involve
calculations that take into account political action occurring across multiple
arenas. One part of this calculation may involve activities in the protest arena,
the engagement of state-mobilized organizations in contention and
countermobilization to support the government or, more darkly, in violence
against opposition protesters. But the calculation may also involve the activities
of state-mobilized organizations in the electoral arena, such as getting out the
vote on behalf of pro-regime parties and politicians or action in the realm of
local governance. To best understand the shifting landscape of state-mobilized
organizations over time in Venezuela (and elsewhere), we have to appreciate
this broader strategic landscape composed of multiple arenas.
In considering the Venezuelan case, it is heuristically useful to think of these
three arenas of action – the protest arena, the electoral arena, and the local
governance arena – and to locate the major Bolivarian initiatives in state-
mobilized organizations with respect to their respective emphases. Figure 9.1
displays this notion graphically. It should be emphasized that this is a heuristic
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and that the locations in this space are not precisely fixed: For example,
Communal Councils (CCs) have engaged in activity in the protest arena, but
it has not been an emphasis for that group of organizations. Therefore, they are
located in the figure only at the intersection of the electoral and local governance
arenas. The numbers in parentheses refer to the phases of the Fifth Republic in
which each organization was created or, in the case of the colectivos, increased
in prominence.
We can alsomatch these three arenas of politics with nominal values from the
typology of mobilization strategies developed in the volume’s introduction. The
local governance arena is marked by mobilization for infrastructural
development, attempts to use organize society to accomplish development
projects that local state officials are incapable or unwilling to undertake. The
protest arena is most likely to be characterized by defensive or reactive
mobilization, as government mobilizes supporters to engage in counterprotest
against contentious forces in society. Finally, proactive mobilization seems
likely to be the dominant form in the electoral arena: state incumbents build
up grassroots organizing capacity in advance of elections, seeking to establish
an organizational advantage that will allow them to withstand anticipated
opposition challenges.
Figure 9.1, when supplemented by the additional information provided in
Table 9.2, also helps us better consider the logic of temporal change among
state-mobilized organizations in Venezuela. We can see two broad trends. First,
the emphasis of SMMs on local governance has risen and fallen with the threat
level of the opposition. In the first few years of the Chávez era, with the
opposition in total disarray, initiatives almost exclusively focused on
stimulating citizen participation and organization in local governance,
a longtime ideological emphasis of the Bolivarian Movement. This focus
figure 9.1 Arenas of operation and dominant types of mobilization
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dropped off somewhat as the opposition threat swelled in 2001–2003, was
accentuated again as the opposition threat level diminished in 2004–2012,
and then dropped off again in the current period, when the opposition threat
has been at its highest.
Second, to the extent that state-mobilized organizations have been geared
toward countering opposition threats, their relative emphasis on the protest or
electoral arena has mirrored the nature of the gravest threat. When the
opposition was contesting power in the streets during the 2001–2003 period,
the government launched the Bolivarian Circle program to meet that challenge.
Once the opposition returned to the electoral arena from 2004 to 2012, the
government launched the Communal Council program. And with the
opposition presenting grave threats both in the streets and at the ballot box
from 2013 onward, the government has emphasized groups like the colectivos
and UbCh that are explicitly politicized and together can operate in both
spheres. Less well conveyed, but discussed further in Section 9.7, is that these
groups are not just active in the protest arena but have shifted increasingly
toward repression rather than simple counterprotest.
9.4 very little opposition threats, 1999–2000
The years immediately following Chávez’s 1998 election were marked by
a rapid sequence of controversial institutional reforms and a reeling
opposition that presented very little threat to the new government. The arrival
to power of Chávez in early 1999 was followed by a referendum on writing
a new constitution, elections to select a constituent assembly to author the
document (which were rigged to favor the Bolivarian Movement), another
referendum to approve the document, and then “mega-elections” in July 2000
for all elected positions mandates by the newmagna carta. With the population
largely supportive of the constitutional reform process, a bitterly divided
opposition provided little threat to Chávez and the Bolivarian Movement
during this stage in either the protest or electoral arenas.
table 9.2 Opposition threats and state mobilization responses across four phases
Phase Rough Dates Key Organizations
Opposition Threat Level
and Arena
1 1999–2000 Urban Land Committees (CTU),
Water Tables (MTA)
Very low, none
2 2001–2003 Bolivarian Circles (BC) High, protest arena
3 2004–2012 Communal Councils (CC) Moderate, electoral arena




9.4.1 Water Tables and Urban Land Committees
With the Chávez administration focused on institutional reform and remaking
the state, initiatives to mobilize society were modest and had great trouble
getting off the ground. Nevertheless, the government did at least attempt to
push forward two such programs to sponsor local-level organization and
mobilization among supporters. As predicted by the theory, in the absence of
a meaningful opposition threat these initiatives focused overwhelmingly on
local governance or, in the terminology of this volume, infrastructural
mobilization, in keeping with the ideological commitments of the new
government.
As the Bolivarian Movement came to power, lack of access to potable water
and improved sanitation presented a serious and all-too-common problem,
especially in rural communities. The most concerted action of the government
to support social organization and mobilization as a means of fighting poverty
was the extension of a program to sponsor the formation of Mesas Técnicas de
Agua (MTA), community-based associations that would work with
government agencies to improve water and sanitation infrastructure in
underserved neighborhoods. During Chávez’s first months in office, the
government organized a series of workshops and meetings to discuss the
national expansion of the program (Arconada Rodríguez, 2005). Attempts to
translate plans into policy action proved difficult, given that they required
larger-scale changes to the regulation of water provision in the country. While
it took several further years for MTA to proliferate, the key point for present
purposes is that they were born in a context of low threat and designed
exclusively for infrastructural mobilization in the local governance arena.1
A similar program also emerged during this period in the area of housing.
One of the more ambitious initiatives to emerge in the first year of the Chávez
administration was El Programa de Habilitación Física de Barrios,
a comprehensive policy agenda developed by El Consejo Nacional de la
Vivienda (CONAVI), a national entity established a decade previously to
address the systemic housing problems in the country. In laying out a new
approach for dealing with housing problems, CONAVI declared that “to
incorporate and support the organizations of residential communities” should
be a central aspect of the process of addressing housing problems (Giménez,
Rivas, and Rodríguez, 2007). This plan would eventually lead to a program to
support and sponsor thousands of Comités de Tierra Urbana (CTU),
neighborhood organizations in poor areas devoted to dealing with housing
issues such as land titling and infrastructure. As with the MTA,
implementation of these plans was slowed and complicated by the political
1 According to official documents from HIDROVEN (n.d.), the number of MTA rose from 100 in
2001 to 960 in 2003.
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context. But, like the MTA, the program again showed the government’s focus
on infrastructural mobilization when not facing serious opposition threats.
9.5 strong opposition threats in the protest arena,
2001–2003
By 2001 opposition forces had regrouped enough to pose a real challenge to the
Chávez government. This year inaugurated an extremely polarizing period in
which the opposition attempted to oust Chávez through a variety of
nonelectoral means and during which the ability to mobilize supporters into
the streets and control the public sphere was critical for both sides in the
conflict. Reactive forms of mobilization in the protest arena became the
dominant strategy of the government.
Opposition protest mobilizations occurred frequently throughout 2001 but
increased notably at the end of the year, after the Chávez administration
controversially used an enabling law to implement a sweeping package of new
economic policies by decree. As opposition protests became more regular and
swelled in size, they were increasingly met by loyalist counterprotests. Each side
was putting tens of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of people
onto the streets of Caracas on an almost weekly basis. This increasingly tense
atmosphere reached a peak in April 2002 when the opposition launched
a complex coup attempt, which began with a massive march on Miraflores
Palace that was met by a large loyalist mobilization, a clash that left several
people dead, violence used as a pretext for a military takeover. While the
opposition plotters succeeded in removing Chávez from Miraflores and taking
him to a remote island military base, the coup broke down after disagreements
emerged among the key players and after loyalist forces mobilized thousands of
Venezuelans into the streets in protest.
Even after the failure of the April 2002 coup, opposition protest
activity and attempts to oust Chávez remained ongoing. The opposition
continued to mobilize into the streets on a semi-regular basis throughout
the rest of the year and then launched a massive general strike, including
a shutdown of the oil industry, spanning December 2002–February 2003.
It was not until the disastrous failure of this strike, which had dire
economic consequences and greatly discredited the opposition in the
minds of the Venezuelan public, that the opposition moved away from
contentious strategies and began to focus on the electoral arena. They did
so through activating a clause in the Bolivarian constitution allowing for
referenda to be convened to recall elected officials. Ultimately, after
considerably delays, a referendum to recall Chávez failed in
August 2004. This sequence of events augured the dawning of a new
phase in Venezuelan politics, taken up in Section 9.6, marked by
a substantial decrease in protest on both sides and contestation largely
occurring at the ballot box.
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9.5.1 The Bolivarian Circles
While Chávez and the MVR had long made the sponsorship of social
organization a central part of their program, initiatives in this regard were
relatively small in scale in the initial years of the Bolivarian era. As protest
activity by the opposition picked up, the government launched a much more
ambitious effort to sponsor organization and collective action among loyalists,
calling for the formation of Bolivarian Circles by supporters around the country
(Arenas and Gómez Calcaño, 2005). Chávez had first mentioned the possibility
of forming the Circles in mid-2000, but the initiative really picked up steam in
late 2001, with the president conducting a massive rally that December to
swear-in members, publicize the initiative, and galvanize support. Estimates
of the total number of Circles have varied widely, but there is little doubt that
this was a very large – if relatively short-lived – initiative.2 The program was
relatively informal, particularly compared to later initiatives. It established a set
of coordinating structures and a formal registry of Circles, enabling some degree
of contacting and joint action. But these structures were poorly
institutionalized, many Circles appear to have been formed and then quickly
gone defunct, and the program was supported with very few resources
(Hawkins and Hansen, 2006).
The Circles played roles in local governance but also were clearly oriented
toward activity in the protest arena, organizations capable of mobilizing
supporters and other community members into the streets on short notice in
defense of the Bolivarian Revolution. Scholars have commonly seen the Circles
as playing particularly important roles in the countermobilizations that became
increasingly frequent, particularly in Caracas, during the extremely tense
months of late 2001 and early 2002 (García-Guadilla, 2004). At times, the
Circles also engaged in contentious activity for other strategic purposes, beyond
simply providing a counterbalance to opposition protests. For example, in one
episode, Circles led a major protest alleging unfair treatment of the government
in El Nacional, one of Venezuela’s leading newspapers, which succeeded in
shutting down the newspaper for a day (Inter-Press Service, 2002).
Nevertheless, countermobilization was clearly the dominant purpose of Circle
activity in the protest arena.
The Bolivarian Circles became best known for the roles they played in the
events of the 2002 coup. The days leading up to the coup had been filled with
tension, with both sides suspecting that a breaking point was nearing. In this
context, Chávez and close advisers discussed plans for having armed Circles
surround Miraflores palace in case of an opposition attempt to besiege the
house of government (Nelson, 2009). When the opposition did begin its
2 Coordinators of the Bolivarian Circle program at times claimed as many as 200,000, numbers
that seem unrealistic. In contrast, Hawkins and Hansen (2006) estimate that the true number is
more likely between 9,500 and 11,000 active Circles at the height of the program.
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massive march onMiraflores, the Circles were central actors in rallying the pro-
government countermobilization. More ominously, members of Circles were
responsible for at least some of the deadly violence when the two marches
clashed, with footage capturing a known Circle leader firing a gun at the
opposition from an overpass. After the coup occurred, and Chávez was taken
by force out of Miraflores, Circles are also widely credited with helping lead the
massive popular protest that surrounded Miraflores and demanded the return
of the president (Roberts, 2006). After the coup, the Circles continued to be
important actors during the remainder of this period of intense polarization.
During the extremely tense 10-week general strike of late 2002 and early 2003,
the Circles were also active in community provisioning and leading
counterprotests denouncing the general strike.
When the opposition renounced attempts to remove Chávez by extra-
constitutional means and shifted its strategic focus toward the electoral
arena, however, several drawbacks and strategic limitations of the Circle
program became particularly pronounced. First, the Circle program
revealed a dynamic that would recur repeatedly in later years. The
Bolivarian government relied heavily on state-mobilized groups as allies
and actors in the political struggle but had difficulty controlling the
actions of these groups, with adverse consequences for its larger
campaign to win public opinion. Due to the activities of some groups
during the 2002–2003 struggle, the Circles acquired a reputation as
violent and repressive. The opposition certainly influenced this negative
portrayal, taking every opportunity to denounce them as thugs and which
probably unfairly exaggerated the centrality of violence and intimidation
(versus more benign community work) to their activities. Nevertheless,
surveys showed that a substantial majority of Venezuelans disapproved of
the Circles. They were one of the least popular political actors in all of
Venezuela – on either the pro-government or pro-opposition side – during
the 2002–2004 period.
The limited ability of the government to control, monitor, and direct
the activities of the Circles also manifested itself in their limited use in the
electoral arena. The Circles participated heavily in the campaign to defeat
the recall referendum in 2004 (Hawkins and Hansen, 2006). As poorly
financed and largely informal groups that operated with a substantial
degree of independence, and which were often very skeptical of the
MVR, the Circles were not well designed to be mobilizers of electoral
support. In sum, the Circle program revealed some problems that would
not go away – a basic limitation in the ability of the government to
monitor and control such groups – but also possessed some specific
drawbacks related to the informal and uninstitutionalized way the
program had developed. In this latter respect, they were a poor fit for
the next phase of the Fifth Republic, when contestation returned to the
electoral arena.
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9.6 moderate opposition threats in the electoral arena,
2004–2012
The aftermath of the recall referendum sawVenezuela move into a new phase in
which the opposition gave up trying to oust Chávez through nonconstitutional
channels and committed to the electoral arena. This strategic reorientation did
not occur immediately and did not receive universal support. The opposition
ended up strategically boycotting the 2005 legislative elections at the
last minute. While leaders cited concerns regarding fraud as their rationale,
the fact that polls predicted a massive defeat – partly a product of a lack of
opposition unity and continued sectors bent on electoral abstention – probably
also played into their calculus. From the presidential elections of 2006 onward,
however, the opposition launched a committed effort in every subsequentmajor
election and referendum in the country and did so increasingly unified as the
Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) front. These elections were not just fully
contested but also, as Table 9.1 earlier in the chapter indicated, very frequent.
From 2005 through 2012, a major election or referendum occurred every year
except 2011.
Opposition activity in the protest arena did not cease completely during this
period. The opposition still took to the streets during campaign season and to
protest particularly egregious actions by the government. The most notable
protest cycle occurred in 2007, when a wave of student-led protests occurred
in response to the government’s closing of RCTV, an unabashedly pro-
opposition broadcaster (Brading, 2012). Some of the same student groups
that led these protests then continued to mobilize actively in late 2007 in
opposition to the government’s referendum of that year on planned changes
to the constitution. In the big picture, however, this period marked a sea change
in activity within the protest arena. Contentious action by the opposition was
less frequent and no longer posed an existential threat to the Chávez
government – rather than hundreds of thousands of protesters, thousands or
perhaps 10,000 might take to the streets of Caracas. And rather than street
mobilizations being led by an opposition bent on removing the government
through any means possible (such as coups or massive strikes), this protest
activity occurred in a context in which the opposition had renounced such
strategies and was grimly determined to contest power at the ballot box.
During late 2004, coming off the victory in the recall referendum, a high-level
meeting of Bolivarian officials took place in which Chávez and a close coterie of
advisers proposed what was termed a “New Strategic Map” for navigating
a new era in which they had emerged triumphant, would have much more
leeway to implement their policy agenda, and expected the opposition to keep
trying to take power through elections and not the streets. This document laid
out a great variety of policy and strategy proposals, most of which are irrelevant
for present concerns. Two particularly pertinent features were a call to rethink
and reinvigorate Bolivarian political parties – an idea that eventually led to the
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dismantlement of the MVR and the creation of a new party, the PSUV, with
a much stronger emphasis on grassroots organization – and an emphasis on
reinvigorating commitments and programs to enhance citizen participation and
organization in local governance.
9.6.1 The Communal Councils
In early 2006, the government launched the Communal Council program, an
initiative of unprecedented scope and ambition geared toward building popular
power through state-sponsored community organizations (García-Guadilla,
2007; Machado, 2008). Unlike the Bolivarian Circle initiative, the Communal
Council program was implemented through the legislature, with the passing of
the Ley de Consejos Comunales, which established a very detailed set of
procedures by which small communities of about 200 households (fewer in
rural areas) could join together and form a state-sanctioned neighborhood
organization that would assume a variety of local governance functions.
Requirements in this process included the conducting of a local census,
advertising the planned formation of the Council, holding votes for a variety
of council offices and leadership positions, and filing substantial paperwork
with government officials. The program was supported and pushed forward by
multiple entities of the Venezuelan government. At the national level, the agency
Fundacomunal was repurposed and tasked with helping implement the
Communal Council program, holding workshops and events to publicize the
program, meeting with communities to help them navigate the process,
handling the formal registration, and also disbursing a great deal of funding.
But many municipal and state governments also became involved with the
administration and support of the program in various ways. By early 2008,
over 18,000 Councils had been formally registered with the government. Later
estimates would place that number over 30,000.
While overtly cast as organizations tasked with local governance functions,
the Communal Councils also became de facto grassroots organizations of the
PSUV, heavily involved in electoral mobilization (Handlin, 2013, 2016). PSUV
leaders referred to the Councils openly as the “base units” of the new party. The
Councils played important roles in the process of building the party,
particularly in signing up party members and helping recruit people into party
activism. Perhaps most notably, the Councils also engaged in various forms of
electoral mobilization in the elections and campaigns held from 2006 onward,
holding joint events with PSUV politicians in communities, helping mobilize
people to campaign rallies, serving as channels for the distribution of patronage,
and urging voters to the polls. To the extent that the Communal Councils
operated outside the local governance arena, then, their primary function was
clearly to support the Bolivarian Movement and PSUV in the electoral arena
during a time in which the opposition made contestation at the ballot box the
focus of its efforts.
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In contrast, the Communal Councils played only relatively minor roles in the
protest arena. They often engaged in discrete forms of local claim-making,
which in some instances might escalate into small-scale contentious activity
(e.g. organizing a group of people to march on city hall in a provincial city and
demand better water and sanitation services). But the Communal Councils were
not major actors in organizing larger-scale counterprotests or otherwise
managing the protest arena. For one, the opposition did not make contentious
activity in the protest arena a central thrust of its own strategy during this time,
so the need to use state-sponsored groups like the Communal Councils as
vehicles for regularly mobilizing regime supporters into the streets was far less
acute than in the 2001–2004 period.
Moreover, to the extent that the opposition did engage in major protest
activity during the 2005–2012 period, the student movement tended to be the
protagonist. Just as the Putin government in Russia learned from the color
revolutions and sponsored the pro-Kremlin student group Nashi to counter
student opposition, the Chávez government reacted to the upsurge in student
activism and mobilization by creating its own pro-government student groups.
These Chavista student organizations engaged in regularized activities on
campuses. But they were also engaged in selective counterprotests to show the
country that part of the younger generation was aligned with the Bolivarian
Project. The specific form of opposition protest activity during this period
therefore called for a more specific form of SMMs for which the Communal
Councils, in which older community leaders and activists tended to be most
involved, were a poor demographic fit.
9.7 very serious opposition threats in both arenas,
2013–2017
Two shocks massively altered the political environment in Venezuela after
2012, with great implications for the strategies and threat level of the
opposition and, in consequence, for the government’s approach to state
mobilization of loyalist groups. First, Chávez died in early 2013 after
a long battle with cancer, the details of which had been mainly kept hidden
from the public. The death of personalistic leaders is famously difficult for
autocratic regimes, often setting off messy succession conflicts. Chávez
ameliorated this problem to some degree by naming Maduro as
a designated successor, but fissures within the Bolivarian coalition still
became much more pronounced, especially divides between a radical leftist
sector (which Maduro headed) and a more cynical, nonideological sector
with backgrounds in the military and security forces (exemplified by
Cabello). Just as importantly, Chávez had great charisma and had
developed very personalized forms of linkage with many followers. It was
never likely that another politician, particularly one as inept as Maduro,
would be able to replicate this appeal.
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The strength of Chavismo after Chávez was soon put to the test, since the
Venezuelan constitution mandated that a new election be held, Chávez having
died before being able to begin his new presidential term. Whereas Chávez
had won the 2012 presidential election by about 11 percentage points against
Henrique Capriles, Maduro won an election six months later against the same
opponent by only 2 percentage points. Chavismo did not fall apart without
Chávez, but the nine-point swing was significant. Just as importantly, the
razor-thin victory did nothing to quell uncertainties regarding whether
Maduro would be able to hold together the Bolivarian coalition at the elite
and mass levels, particularly in times of difficulty. The death of Chávez, the
close margin of the 2013 election, and allegations of fraud in that election
emboldened a more hard-line wing of the opposition to launch an extended
cycle of protests in early 2014. While the protests subsided over time, they
would return on a grand scale in 2016, substantially in response to the
government’s blocking opposition attempts to trigger a referendum to recall
Maduro from office. These cycles of protest, which involved massive
mobilizations and semipermanent roadblocks, represented the biggest threat
to the Bolivarian government in the protest arena since the
2001–2003 period.
The government’s troubles were greatly accentuated by a subsequent
economic collapse, stemming from both long-term macroeconomic and fiscal
mismanagement and a steep fall in global oil prices that began in the middle of
2014. Despite the opposition’s reinvigorated contentious activity, the Maduro
government maintained decent approval ratings up through mid-2014 and
looked to have successfully stalemated the new wave of protest. The collapse
of global oil prices plunged Venezuela into a massive recession, also marked by
growing scarcities of basic goods, which turned public opinion sharply against
the government and drove the opposition to a historic rout in the 2015
legislative elections. In the following year, the economy further collapsed in
tragic ways, leading to hyperinflation, widespread hunger, and unprecedented
deprivation. Meanwhile, political tensions ratcheted up, as the Maduro
government effectively acted as if the legislature possessed no power while
using its hold over the Supreme Court to thwart opposition attempts to
trigger a constitutional provision to hold a referendum on recalling the
president. In sum, the government came under very high levels of threat –
truly unprecedented levels – in both the protest and electoral arenas during
this period.
9.7.1 Colectivos and UBCh
The government’s response in terms of statemobilization during this periodwas
to reinvigorate or create new groups composed of extreme loyalists that had
little to dowith local governance andwere explicitly geared toward action in the
protest and electoral arenas. After the formation of the PSUV, the government
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had begun to experiment with the creation of formal local party organizations
to augment the more informally affiliated, albeit very numerous and well-
resourced, Communal Councils. In 2009, assemblies were held across the
country to begin the process of forming “Socialist Patrols,” local groups of
activists that would be individually matched to every voting center in the
country and responsible for electoral mobilization within that territory. While
active in certain elections, however, these Socialist Patrols had never been fully
institutionalized within the party, and many had become defunct.
After the death of Chávez in early 2013, and with a new presidential election
now scheduled, the PSUV launched a major initiative to restructure and
reinvigorate its formal local party organization through the creation of the
UBCh, which would become the new base organizational unit of the party.
The push to create UBCh was clearly motivated by the death of Chávez and the
realization among leaders of the Bolivarian Movement that the opposition
threat in the electoral arena would be heightened. But the UBCh were not just
another temporary iteration of local party organization like the Socialist
Patrols. Rather, they were intended to be a “permanent element of
propaganda and mobilization” that would “strengthen and expand the
vanguard” of the Bolivarian Revolution every day” and which should assume
some ill-defined responsibilities in local governance in their communities. In
effect, the UBChwere designed to be highly politicized organizations that would
be agents of electoral mobilization but also capable of acting the protest arena
and establishing permanent positions within communities. This put them into
potential conflict with Communal Councils operating in the same
neighborhoods. In the Bolivarian mediascape, substantial debate surrounded
the question of what the relationship between the Councils and UBCh should be
andwhether the UBChwere undermining the “popular power” exercised by the
Councils.
The second consequential form of state mobilization during this period was
the activation, or reactivation, of a more informal set of organizations, many of
which were rooted in the Bolivarian Circle initiative, known colloquially as
colectivos. These colectivos are informal, highly revolutionary neighborhood-
based organizations that view themselves as defenders of the Bolivarian
Revolution, although they may maintain critical postures toward the
government. Generalizing further about the colectivos is difficult. As with the
Bolivarian Circles, the activities of a set of high-profile colectivos may not be
representative of the activities of the broader population of colectivos. Many
colectivos do not engage in violence and are simply groups of militant
revolutionary leftists who view themselves as defenders of their communities
and the vanguard of the Bolivarian Revolution. Nevertheless, a subset of armed
colectivos came to play a salient and controversial role in Venezuelan politics in
the 2013–2017 period.
Both the UBCh and colectivos were actively involved in standard forms of
countermobilization, organizing demonstrations and pouring into the streets in
Mirroring Opposition Threats: Bolivarian Venezuela 233
response to opposition protest cycles and as ways to rally support for
a beleaguered government. For example, the Maduro government used the
UbCh and colectivos as key grassroots mobilizational actors for massive
national-scale events in late 2016 labeled the “Anti-Coup March” and the
“Venezuela, Indestructible Heart Campaign,” which both sought to cast
opposition attempts to remove Maduro as undemocratic, to blame the
opposition for launching a financial war that was destroying the Venezuelan
economy, and to rally the government’s dwindling support more generally.
Similar types of countermobilizational events were also held in previous years
during this period of elevated opposition threats.
The armed colectivos, and some portion of the UBCh, were centrally
involved in the Venezuelan government’s heightened attempts to control and
manage the protest arena through repression and intimidation. When massive
protests first broke out in February 2014, PSUV leader Francisco Ameliach
tweeted, “UBCh prepare yourselves for an immediate counter-attack. Diosdado
will give the order.” The following months were marked by numerous
notorious instances in which armed colectivos and UBCh violently clashed
with protesters. When the opposition announced plans for a massive
mobilization to protest the government’s blocking of an attempted recall
referendum in 2016, Vice President Aristóbulo Istúriz responded by saying
that the government would fill the streets of Caracas with colectivos and their
“iron horses,” a reference to the motorcycles that armed colectivos have often
used when making a show of force on the streets (Infobae, 2016). An extensive
report from Human Rights Watch (2014) documents high degrees of
collaboration between armed Bolivarian civilian groups – colectivos and
UBChs – and government security forces. This collaborative activity took
different forms. In some instances, security forces policing a protest suddenly
disappeared, and colectivos or UBCh descended soon after to beat up protesters.
In other instances, armed civilian groups and security forces operated side-by-
side in forcefully detaining, and even opening fire upon, protesters.
Empowering a subset of colectivos and UBCh in this way had doubled-
edged consequences for the Maduro government. The armed civilian groups
allowed the government to exert a higher degree of repression on opposition
protesters, therefore helping stalemate the initial wave of protests in 2014,
while minimizing the degree to which security forces were directly
implicated in the violence. While serious investigations of the violence
would still conclude that the government was responsible for substantial
repression, either directly or because they empowered the armed civilian
groups, this more nuanced perspective is not necessarily dominant among
Venezuelans or international audiences. In this sense, the use of state-
mobilized groups to repressively manage the protest arena can be seen
within a larger pattern in which autocratic regimes like Venezuela and
Russia often engage in disinformation campaigns or other deliberate
attempts to “muddy the water” in ways that allow them to get away with
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certain types of behavior without facing the full consequences in terms of
domestic or international opinion.
On the other hand, the colectivos and – to a lesser degree – UBCh proved
difficult to control, much like the Bolivarian Circles of a decade earlier, creating
various unintended consequences and forms of blowback. While it is hard to
know whether any given instance of colectivo repression is sanctioned or not, it
seems likely that the government tried to curtail their repressive activities yet
was not able to fully stop the violence, hurting them in the court of public
opinion. Part of the issue seems to be the limited ability, or willingness, of the
Venezuelan security services to fully control these groups, with which they
otherwise may act in concert at times.
Some colectivos also likely function as criminal organizations involved in the
drug trade and racketeering, activities that may bring them into cooperation,
conflict, or both with parts of the Venezuelan security forces. The murkiness of
these connections was put on display in a sequence of events in October 2014.
First, Robert Serra, a young rising star within the PSUV known to be heavily
linked to colectivos – he had also been a central figure in organizing youth
counterprotests in the 2007 protest cycle –was found mysteriously murdered in
his Caracas home. Several days afterward, an armed standoff occurred in
Caracas between security forces and a major colectivo, which left five
colectivo leaders dead, including one very closely linked to Serra. In response,
this colectivo went public with demands that Interior Minister Miguel
Rodríguez Torres, long associated with close relationships with armed
Bolivarian Circles and Colectivos, resign for his role in the murders, and not
long afterward the minister was shuffled to a new post. While the true
relationship between all these events remains unknown, they underscore the
murky territory created when the government empowers and mobilizes armed
civilian groups, which may not only play roles in the protest arena but which
may clash with state forces or become pawns in power struggles between
competing government factions.
The ability of Bolivarian governmental forces to control at least some of
the colectivos further deteriorated in 2016 (Stratfor, 2016). As the economic
collapse took on truly dire dimensions, marked by widespread shortages
and hunger, some colectivos increased their criminal activity while growing
increasingly disenchanted with the Maduro government, which they
increasingly viewed as corrupt (Casey, 2016). Many colectivos exerted de
facto control over neighborhoods in major cities, sometimes in cooperation
with security forces but often in open defiance of them. While some
residents may see the local colectivo as a source of aid and provisioning,
others may view them as exploitative criminals empowered by the
Bolivarian government. At the very least, this fracturing of control over
state-mobilized groups in Venezuela further complicated and undermined
the Maduro government’s already tenuous ability to exert social and
political control over the country.
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In sum, the recent period has been one in which unprecedented threats in
both the protest and electoral arenas led the Bolivarian government to
emphasize the mobilization of a new set of highly loyal and politicized
organizations, much more explicitly geared toward political action rather
than local governance and, most ominously, much more willing to engage in
repression and violence as a means to counteract opposition activity in the
protest arena. While the colectivos and UBCh proved useful in some ways,
helping the government stave off the opposition for the moment, they also
created other troubles. State weakness in Venezuela meant that government
bureaucrats and security services had great difficulty controlling state-
mobilized groups once these entities had been called into life through the
Bolivarian Revolution. The dramatic and tragic economic collapse of the
country greatly exacerbated this dynamic, leading to an increasing fracturing
of authority and control.
9.8 conclusion
This chapter examined the evolution and logic of state mobilization in
Bolivarian Venezuela from 1999 to 2017. Two contextual conditions help
explain important aspects of the case and differentiate it from others
examined in this volume. The extremely competitive nature of the Venezuelan
regime created great incentives for the government to use state-mobilized
groups mainly for the purposes of proactive and reactive mobilization, as
a means to counter opposition threats in the protest and electoral arenas. The
weak Venezuelan state, in turn, has meant that the government has faced great
difficulties in controlling state-mobilized groups, as bureaucracies and security
services did not have substantial capacity tomonitor their activities and credibly
punish those groups for non-sanctioned behavior.
The bulk of the chapter then focused on explaining the logic underlying
change over time in state mobilization, developing and testing a mirroring
theory that centered on two propositions. First, the government’s emphasis on
infrastructural mobilization, most keeping with its ideological commitments,
waxed and waned with the degree of opposition threat. The imperative of
dealing with threats to power, through proactive and reactive mobilization,
has clearly taken precedence over the use of infrastructural mobilization to
achieve longer-term programmatic goals. Second, when mobilizing society to
deal with opposition threats, the government has focused on sponsoring
movements and organizations suited to operating in whichever arena of
politics, that of protests or elections, the opposition was most threatening at
the time. The need to respond to a shifting threat landscape helps explain why
the Bolivarian Movement has sponsored the formation of so many different
kinds of organizations and movements during its nearly twenty years in power.
This should be a useful framework for understand the logic of SMMs in other
authoritarian cases. As the scope conditions make clear, authoritarian regime
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type delimits relevant arenas of politics and whether or not incumbents are
liable to face open challenges in the protest and/or electoral arenas. State elites
in closed autocracies face a very different strategic landscape than in
competitive authoritarian regimes, and the logic of their mobilizational
choices will differ accordingly. The mirroring theory seems like it might
produce the greatest traction, however, when applied within other
competitive autocracies. Other chapters of this volume note that autocratic
incumbents engage in reactive mobilization of protest-oriented movements to
deal with opposition threats in that arena (Chapters 2 and 7). Others find that
electoral authoritarian governments that anticipate genuine threats at the ballot
box also often seek to mobilize society to help in electioneering (Chapter 10).
A versatile and shifting repertoire of mobilizational strategies, which can be
tailored to the needs and threats of the day, may be particularly helpful in ruling
by other means.
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